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AFOCP-R

Aisle Seat Security 3 August 1959

b.

M/G Whisenand, Special Assistant to Chairman, JCS

1. A thorough investigation of all aspects of Aisle Seat security has been completed by the USAF. The inquiry was designed to:

a. Examine adequacy of security in planning and execution of missions.

b. Examine adequacy of communications security.

c. Determine whether the Chicoms possessed actual prior knowledge of Aisle Seat operations.

2. Conclusions:

a. There is no indication of espionage within the organizations involved in Aisle Seat activities.

b. Security in the mission planning and execution stage can be tightened.

c. There were certain pre-mission activities which could be varied to further safeguard scheduled operations.

d. There is no evidence of compromise of SSO communication channels or on-line encryption channels.

e. Chicom communication intercept of clear-text and telephone messages in Air Defense networks may have occurred.

f. The Chicoms undoubtedly utilize their ability to forecast weather and light conditions suitable for aerial photography on the mainland as the basis of some of the indicated instances of Aisle Seat mission prediction. These factors, plus Chicom knowledge of previous operations, obtained through radar tracking of Aisle Seat aircraft, provide a basis for predicting planned Aisle Seat flights with some success.

3. .....

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6(b)
Agency Case CIA MDR 96-08
NLE Case 96-221#1
By ____ NLE Date 2/28/97

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5. In order to improve further the security of the Aisle Seat program, the following actions have been taken:

a. Planning and Execution of Missions:

(1) Notification of Hq CAP personnel has been postponed from 1000 hours to 1700 hours on the day prior to a scheduled mission.

(2) Crew briefing has been postponed from 1430 hours on the day prior to a mission until 0430 hours on the morning of the mission.

(3) A requirement has been established to have an English speaking officer on duty every morning at 0300 hours at Weather Central. This eliminates a telephone call on the day prior to a mission to request that an English speaking officer be on duty.

(4) Instructions are being issued to provide variations of above procedures to avoid development of fixed behavior patterns of planning personnel and units. Supervisory personnel will perform a constant watch to avoid any system, communication or physical action which may form a pattern and indicate when a mission will be flown.

b. Communications Security:

(1) Passing of radar suppression messages to Air Defense Control Centers has been delayed from 6 - 8 hours prior to takeoff until 1 - 1½ hours prior to takeoff.

(2) A one-time pad system has been instituted for transmitting radar suppression messages throughout the Air Defense network.

(3) Messages and phone calls in conjunction with mission and training flights have been minimized.

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(4) Dummy radar suppression messages are now passed daily whenever there is no real traffic.

(5) .....
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Missions will be planned to avoid the Japanese ADIZ when possible. If this is not practical, flights will be routed through the far northwest corner of the ADIZ on headings not provocative to Japan so that radar suppression will not be required.

(6) Action has been taken to eliminate the use of single side band conversation except in dire emergency.

(7) Instructions have been issued to eliminate the use of unclassified nicknames in relation to Aisle Seat flights.

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(9) In order that joint US/Chinat and Chinat AN/TRC radiotelephone circuits on Taiwan may be monitored, DIRNSA has authorized exception to prohibition against monitoring communication of the host country.